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Clones, Prototypes and the Right to Uniqueness  
 
 Apstract: Human cloning until recently has been considered to belong to the domain of science 
fiction; now it is a tangible possibility, a hopeful as well as a fearsome one. One of the fears that 
necessarily come along with it is about the peril cloning might represent for human uniqueness, since the 
clones are expected to be identical to their prototypes; this would unavoidably compromise moral agents’ 
right to a unique identity. In this paper I will put under examination the argument against cloning that is 
based upon the right to a unique identity; I will argue that cloning represents no actual threat for anybody’s 
unique identity, therefore this argument is futile. I will also support the view that the so-called right to a 
unique identity is not as indisputable as to serve as the basis of a moral argument against human 
reproductive cloning. 
 Keywords: Human cloning, rights, identity, uniqueness, individuality. 
  
The possibility of creating human beings by means of transferring the nucleus of a 
somatic cell to an enucleated ovum is very likely to allow in the near future for the 
production of humans identical to already existing ones, or to ones that once existed, but 
now do not1. These genetically manufactured humans are usually being referred to as 
clones, and the persons from whom the somatic cell nuclei have been extracted are being 
called prototypes. In my opinion both terms are undue and misleading; I will use them 
henceforward, however, for reasons of compliance with the established terminology. The 
fact that the clones and their prototypes will allegedly be identical to each other is 
considered by some bioethicists to constitute a major threat to some moral rights of the 
clones, rights that non-clones are free to enjoy, such as the right to ignorance2, or that to 
                                                 
1
 National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations of the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (Rockville, Maryland June 1997), 13. 
2
 See Sören Holm, “A Life in the Shadow: One Reason Why We Should Not Clone Humans”, Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 7 (1998): 160-162. Also Hans Jonas, “Lasst uns einen Menschen klonieren: 
Von der Eugenik zu der Gentechnologie”, in Technik, Medizin und Ethik – Praxis des Prinzips der 
Verantwortung, edited by Hans Jonas (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987), 190 and Tuija Takala, “The 
Right to Genetic Ignorance Confirmed”, Bioethics 13.3/4 (1999): 288-293, 289, as well as Juha Raikka, 
“Freedom and the right (not) to know”, Bioethics 12.1 (1998): 49-63, 50-51. 
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an open future etc3. There is a particular right, however, that is considered to be not just 
threatened, but a priori and inescapably violated by the very fact that a person is being 
born as a clone. This is the right to a unique identity, to individuality, or to uniqueness, a 
right that a clone will be in no position to enjoy or even claim due to his or her very 
particular nature and the way he or she has come into existence4. In this short paper I will 
support the view that this objection is grounded neither on fact nor on reason. In 
particular, I will argue that: [a] cloning does not actually compromise neither the 
prototype’s nor the clone’s unique identity, [b] the right to a unique identity is not as 
indisputable as to bolster any moral argument. 
As for my first claim, namely that cloning poses no threat to anyone’s uniqueness, 
I cannot resist the temptation of starting with an argument that might sound like a 
sophism: if the term clone by definition describes a potential person that would be the 
exact copy of another individual, the prototype, and if the prototype is a unique 
individual, then the clone should be a unique individual as well, otherwise he or she 
could not be an exact copy. Hence, either the clone – as an exact copy of a unique 
individual – is a unique individual too, so no one’s uniqueness is at stake, or the clone is 
not an exact copy of the prototype – since he or she lacks at least one property or quality 
the prototype possesses – so again no one’s individuality is being compromised. This 
sounds like a witticism, of course, since common belief holds on the one hand that exact 
duplication is achievable, and on the other that the property or quality of uniqueness is 
exactly what is being destroyed by duplication.  
To Leibniz, however, my sophism would rather seem as a synopsis of his view 
that there can be no exact duplicates in nature, either natural or artificial. To him, “… it is 
not true that two substances can resemble each other completely and differ only in 
number”5, or, as he explains elsewhere, “in nature, there cannot be two individual things 
that differ in number alone. For it certainly must be possible to explain why they are 
different, and that explanation must derive from some difference they contain… for never 
do we find two eggs or two leaves or two blades of grass in a garden that are perfectly 
similar. And thus, perfect similarity is found only in incomplete and abstract notions, 
where things are considered only in a certain respect”6. This is Leibniz’s law for the 
identity of the indiscernibles, according to which if two beings have every quality of 
theirs in common, they cannot be two, but are actually one. Tagging along after Leibniz 
John McTaggart derived his own law for the dissimilarity of the diverse by applying the 
rule of contraposition to Leibniz’s maxim: if two beings are numerically distinct, then 
they should also be qualitative distinct, to wit there must be at least one quality that one 
                                                 
3
 See Helga Kuhse, “Should Cloning Be Banned for the Sake of the Child?”, Poiesis and Praxis 1 (2001): 
17-33, 20. Also Dena Davis, “Genetic Dilemmas and the Childs Right to an Open Future”, Hastings Center 
Report 27.2 (1997): 7-15, 9. For the right to an open future see Joel Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment: 
Philosophical Essays (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 76 ff. 
4
 The European Parliament, “Resolution on Cloning”, Official Journal C 034 02/02/1998, p. 0164: “The 
European Parliament, […] 1. Stresses that each individual has a right to his or her own genetic identity and 
that human cloning is, and must continue to be, prohibited; 2.  Calls for an explicit worldwide ban on the 
cloning of human beings; 3.  Urges the Member States to ban the cloning of human beings at all stages of 
formation and development, regardless of the method used […]”. 
5
 Gottfried W. F. von Leibniz, “Discourse on Metaphysics”, Philosophical Essays, translated by Roger 
Ariew & Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 41-42. 
6
 Ibid., “Primary Truths”, 32. 
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of these two beings has, but the other lacks7. As McTaggart puts it, diversity implies 
dissimilarity, and two things cannot be exactly equal, or have the same nature. If 
Leibniz’s and McTaggart’s views were applied to cloning, we could only agree that since 
the clone and his or her prototype will be numerically distinct from each other8, there 
should be at least one quality they will not have in common, therefore they will 
necessarily be also qualitative discernible. It seems that in the charming and orderly 
arranged world of propositional logic – or, better, of metaphysics based on logic – my 
initial claim that cloning threatens nobody’s uniqueness wouldn’t that easy be rejected as 
a witticism. 
Our world, however, is not that of propositional logic, therefore arguments like 
the one I just presented are not expected to serve as a satisfactory response to moral 
objections. They surely didn’t convince the members of the European Parliament, who 
declared that each individual has a right to his or her own genetic identity and that human 
cloning is, and must continue to be, prohibited9, or bioethicists like Arthur Caplan, 
among others, who argued regarding cloning that “one of the things we treasure about 
ourselves is our individuality.... You begin to worry that when you deliberately set out to 
make copies of something, you lessen its worth”10. It seems that we think of our 
uniqueness so highly, that much greater effort is required to appease the fear that it might 
be compromised due to cloning. But in which way could human uniqueness be threatened 
by virtue of cloning?  
As I see things, individuals in general are different or similar to each other with 
regard to [a] their genome, [b] their phenotype and, [c] their character and personality. 
When we say that an individual is unique, we assume that it features at least one – even a 
slight – difference to every other of its kind concerning one of these three above 
mentioned categories. It follows that, if an individual is identical to any other of its kind, 
it has to be such with regard to every single one of its properties or attributes at the same 
time. Cloning, therefore, would be a threat to an individual’s unique identity, if and only 
if it proved capable of providing scientists with the means to produce at least two 
individuals with exactly the same genes, looks and character at the same time. This, 
however, doesn’t seem to be a part of the actual powers of cloning.  
Cloning concerning humans so far seems to be attainable primarily – if not solely 
– by means of nuclear transfer, a process that could be roughly outlined as extracting the 
nucleus of a somatic cell taken from the prototype and transferring it to an enucleated 
ovum in order to produce a clone; this method allegedly guarantees that the clone will be 
an exact genetic copy of the somatic cell donor11. This is not exactly accurate, however. 
As far as genomic identification is concerned, it is true that the clone’s gene-set is 
expected to be almost fully determined by the genetic information that is being contained 
in the nucleus of the donor’s somatic cell. The nucleus, though, has to be implanted into 
an enucleated ovum, and the ovum will necessarily convey its own genetic information to 
the clone contributing thus to the clone’s genome. The cytoplasm, actually, which 
                                                 
7
 John McTaggart, The Nature of Existence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), vol. 1, § 94. 
8
 Kathinka Evers, “The Identity of Clones”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 24.1 (1999): 67-76, 69. 
9
 See supra note 4. 
10
 Quoted in Ruth Macklin, “Splitting Embryos on the Slippery Slope: Ethics and Public Policy”, Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics Journal 4.3 (1994): 209-225, 215. 
11
 National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations 
(Rockville, Maryland, 1997), 14. 
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belongs to the ovum, passes on to the new organism the mitochondrial DNA12, which is a 
tiny 0, 05 % of the individual’s overall genetic information13. This might seem like a 
negligible proportion, but in genetics such genomic dissimilarities are of enormous 
significance and result in huge differences, especially if we consider that between 
humans and apes stands only a fragile 2 % of genetic difference, which, nevertheless, 
results in two totally different species. A clone, of course, could only share the genetic 
information of his or her prototype’s nuclear DNA; his or her mitochondrial DNA, 
nevertheless, would be necessarily different, since the enucleated ovum that would be 
used in the procedure of his or her cloning could never be identical to the ovum that 
produced the prototype. In other words, even if our purpose was to duplicate the exact 
Mozart’s genome, for example, in order to succeed in this we would need to be in 
possession not only of one of Mozart’s somatic cells, but also of an ovum extracted from 
his mother’s oocytes14. But not just any ovum would suffice; the only ovum that would 
allow an exact genomic duplication of Mozart would be the one that had been once 
fertilized to produce Mozart, since the genetic information contained in two different ova 
is not stable, even if both have been retrieved from the very same oocyte15. In the light of 
all these some feel safe even to argue that a clone should reasonably be expected to have 
more genetic differences to the prototype than identical twins actually have to each 
other16. If these empirical data are correct, they seem to prove beyond any reasonable 
doubt that exact genomic replication far exceeds the powers of genetic engineering: even 
if the genomic difference between the clone and the prototype would be as slight as 0, 05 
%, the clone would still be genetically different to the prototype although very similar; in 
any case, these two beings would not be identical. Given all these, genetic uniqueness 
seems not to be at stake in the case of human reproductive cloning.  
Let us, however, assume for the sake of the discussion that the advances in 
genetics in the near future are likely to allow geneticists to overcome the obstacles posed 
by the mitochondrial DNA, and that exact duplication of the human genome would 
become achievable. In my view the prospect of producing two individuals with exactly 
the same genome wouldn’t be that objectionable or that fearsome if it didn’t necessarily 
lead to identical phenotypes. But does it? Geneticists so far conclude that our phenotype, 
to wit the way we actually are and look, is not determined solely by our genes17. Aside 
from the gene-set there are numerous other variables that affect gene expression and have 
a major impact on our phenotype. Such factors are, among others, the intrauterine 
environment18, the stages of placentation and embryo-maternal circulation19, the 
                                                 
12
 Helga Kuhse, “Should Cloning Be Banned for the Sake of the Child?”, Poiesis and Praxis 1 (2001): 17-
33, 21. 
13
 Françoise Baylis, “Human Cloning: Three Mistakes and an Alternative”, Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 27.3 (2002): 319-337, 324-325. 
14
 Leon Eisenberg, “The Outcome as Cause: Predestination and Human Cloning”, The Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 1.4 (1976): 318-331, 326. 
15
 Bernard E. Rollin, “Keeping up with the Cloneses: Issues in Human Cloning”, The Journal of Ethics 3.1 
(1999): 51-71, 63. 
16
 Martin LaBar, “The Pros and Cons of Human Cloning”, Thought 59 (1984): 319-333, 325. 
17
 Gregory E. Pence, Who’s Afraid of Human Cloning? (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
1998), 14. 
18
 Françoise Baylis, “Human Cloning: Three Mistakes and an Alternative”, Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 27.3 (2002): 319-337, 324-325. 
19
 Leon Eisenberg, “The Outcome as Cause: Predestination and Human Cloning”, The Journal of Medicine 
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spontaneous mutations genes constantly undergo20, etc. Even monozygotic twins, who 
share an as similar as possible gene-set and uterine environment, are not phenotypically 
identical to each other, and sometimes they differ greatly. Given all these, we are allowed 
to assume that not only will a clone be different from his or her prototype with regard to 
his or her phenotype, but also that multiple clones of the same prototype might differ to 
each other in some degree, as well21. Even if this wasn’t the case, however, and a clone 
actually looked exactly the same as his or her prototype, I don’t see why this should be 
considered of major moral significance concerning either the clone’s or the prototype’s 
right to a unique identity. If physical similarity or identification could actually infringe 
one’s uniqueness, we should assume the same with regard to monozygotic twins. 
Nevertheless, according to the majority of people – philosophers included! – 
monozygotic twins are perfectly unique individuals: they are being treated as such, and 
nobody seriously maintains that their right to a unique identity has been violated by the 
fact that they have been born as twins. To quote John Harris, “artificial clones do not 
raise any difficulties not raised by the phenomenon of natural twins”22. We do not feel 
apprehensive when natural twins are born, why should we when twins are deliberately 
created? One could object, of course, that natural twins just occur as a natural 
phenomenon, while clones will be created by choice, and moral evaluation is applicable 
only to deliberate human deeds. This objection would stand in the case monozygotic 
twins were born only due to spontaneous natural genetic procedures. This is not the case, 
however. Many people undergo fertility enhancement therapies perfectly aware of the 
fact that these techniques more than often result in multiple pregnancy. Nobody, 
however, assumes that this deliberate choice of theirs to undergo fertility enhancement 
therapies is morally objectionable due to the risk of giving birth to monozygotic twins23. 
Since in the case of natural clones we do not tend to assume that something morally 
wrong has happened, I don’t see why we should think the contrary in the case of artificial 
clones – a fortiori since that they are likely to be much less similar to their prototypes 
than monozygotic twins are to their brothers or sisters for the reasons I previously 
explained.  
So far I have argued that the exact duplication of the human genome and 
phenotype is not in the powers of human reproductive cloning, and it seems highly 
unlikely that it ever is. Therefore either the clone’s or the prototype’s right to a unique 
identity is being at stake due to human reproductive cloning, at least as far as genomic 
and phenotypic uniqueness is concerned. At this point I could rest my case, since it is 
more than obvious that two persons that would be genetically unlike (even slightly) and 
would also look different (even slightly) would necessarily count as unique individuals, 
even if they shared exactly the same character and personality traits. Nevertheless, I 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Philosophy 1.4 (1976): 318-331, 324. 
20
 See Lansing M. Prescott, John P. Harley & Donald A. Klein, Microbiology, 5th edition (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 2002), 226 ff. 
21
 Bernard E. Rollin, “Keeping up with the Cloneses: Issues in Human Cloning”, The Journal of Ethics 3.1 
(1999): 51-71, 63. 
22
 John Harris, “Goodbye Dolly?’ The Ethics of Human Cloning”, Journal of Medical Ethics 23 (1997): 
353-360, 353. 
23
 Dan Brock, “Cloning Human Beings: An Assessment of the Ethical Issues Pro and Con”, in Cloning and 
the Future of the Human Embryo Research, edited by Paul Lauritzen, 93-113 (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 103. 
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would like to add a few words concerning the alleged danger of duplicating the 
personality of a human being by means of cloning. Such a belief could stand only in the 
light of the strictest genetic determinism, which is a view that assumes that the character 
and the personality of humans is being determined only by the genomic heritage a person 
is endowed with, to wit by genetic information contained into one’s DNA, and that 
neither the environment in which one grows, nor chance or free will have a part in the 
formation of one’s personality. I totally disagree with genetic determinism, but this is not 
the time to argue in detail against it. I will only suggest that appealing to genetic 
determinism in order to argue that cloning is morally unjustifiable because it violates 
someone’s moral right to his or her unique identity, in my view seems to be neither a 
clever nor an effective choice. This is because, if both personality and character are being 
determined only by a given gene-set, one’s deeds are not for one to decide about; they are 
rather inevitable events to which one is being nolents volents dragged by one’s own 
inherent genetic disposition. If this is so, debates on moral issues – including the one 
concerning the right to a unique identity in relation to human reproductive cloning – are 
only in vain: people will eventually do what their genes compel them to do; therefore all 
arguments for or against cloning (the one that focuses on genetic determinism all the 
same) couldn’t be of any real significance. Nevertheless, those that oppose cloning on 
grounds of genetic determinism seem to hold that their arguments concerning the alleged 
violation of the clone’s right to a unique personality is of some significance for the 
debate, at least as long as they claim that their views should be taken into account. But 
not both can stand at the same time; either genetic determinism is true and moral debates 
are nothing more than just shadow play, or moral discussions have decisive impact on the 
choices of moral agents and genetic determinism is false. If genetic determinism may 
apply to clones, it should equally apply to bioethicists as well.  
In this paper I invested all my efforts in arguing that human reproductive cloning 
puts neither the clone’s nor the prototype’s uniqueness at stake, hence the so-called right 
to a unique identity is irrelevant to the debate concerning human reproductive cloning. I 
would like to conclude with some further thoughts on the applicability of such a right in 
the case of human cloning. As I see it, a moral right outlines some kind of permission or 
freedom that all moral agents should enjoy concerning their choices; in other words, if a 
person is being acknowledged the moral right to something, then this person is free to opt 
– or not to opt – for this something. This something on the one hand has to be considered 
of such high moral significance as to have a moral right exclusively tailored to its 
protection (a right to chewing gum, for example, would be nonsensical), and on the other 
hand it should be in actual peril of being deprived from its claimant or holder due to other 
moral agents’ acts or omissions. When it comes to the so-called right to a unique identity, 
in my view not all the above requirements are actually being met. To begin with, not 
every moral agent can claim the so-called right to a unique identity: naturally born twins 
surely cannot. As a matter of fact, this right seems to have been tailored exclusively for 
clones. If this is the case, then we should have to accept two distinct categories of rights 
holders, one of non-clones (with lesser moral rights, since non-clones would not be 
allowed the right to a unique identity), and another one of clones (who would be 
acknowledged all the rights of the former plus the one to a unique identity). Even if this 
was possible, I cannot see how it could be morally defended. As for the second 
requirement, to argue that one has the right to be born a unique individual can only 
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imply that one would be severely damaged or harmed if he or she was born identical to 
somebody else. But this is not always – or, according to some, it can never be24 – the 
case. Anyone who experiences the misfortune of having been born with spina bifida, 
cystic fibrosis or hydrocephalus would eagerly give away his or her right to a unique 
identity for a chance to be identical to a person with better prospects in life. Uniqueness 
seems to have been a bit overestimated as a property and, anyway, clones could think of 
it as less valuable to them than we do. As for the third requirement, the one that focuses 
on the potential peril that cloning could represent for either the clone’s or the prototype’s 
uniqueness, I have already at length argued that such a view cannot easily be defended. 
The moral debate concerning cloning – and, in particular, human cloning – is 
probably the most challenging in our times, and this is not without a good reason: in its 
core lurk miracles and hopes, power and dreams, high stakes and equally high risks. As it 
is with every moral issue of such significance human cloning has fervent advocates as 
well as dedicated opponents, and both come with sharp arrows in their quivers. In this 
paper I endeavored to determine the sharpness of one of these arrows, and I found it 
faulty. I argued that cloning does not compromise either the clone’s or the prototype’s 
right to a unique identity primarily because the exact duplication of the human genome, 
phenotype and personality is beyond the powers of today’s genetics. I also suggested that 
the right to a unique identity is not as indisputable as to bolster any moral argument. But 
this issue is just a part of a debate that is expected to last long and be a challenging one. 
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Klonovi, prototipi i pravo na jedinstvenost 
  
 Аpstrakt: Donedavno je smatrano da kloniranje ljudi pripada domenu naučne fantastike, a sada je 
to opipljiva mogućnost, koja zastrašuje koliko i uliva nadu. Zastrašuje opasnost koju kloniranje nosi po 
ljudsku jedinstvenost, zato što se od klonova očekuje da budu identični sa svojim prototipovima, te bi to 
neminovno dovelo u pitanje pravo moralnih delatnika na jedinstveni identitet. U radu ću ispitati argument 
protiv kloniranja koji je zasnovan na pravu jedinstvenog identiteta, zastupajući tezu da kloniranje ne 
predstavlja stvarnu pretnju nečijem jedinstvenom identitetu, te je zato taj argument bezuspešan. Takođe ću 
podržati argument po kome tzv. pravo na jedinstveni identitet ne može neosporno da posluži kao osnova 
moralnog argumenta protiv reproduktivnog kloniranja. 
 Ključne reči: kloniranje čoveka, pravo, identitet, jedinstvenost, individualnost.  
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